Forward by Fredric Rice:
You'll notice that the Scientology cult repeatedly tries to demand
that it has the religious right -- under the United States Constitution
and under Florida's Religious Freedom Restoration Act -- to kill its
followers without the State punishing them. Killing its followers is
a religiously-protected right in Scientology.
Does the cult's followers know that?
The Scientology cult demands that being brought up on criminal charges
is some how 'persecution.' And they continue to try to demand that
they're a religion in the first place -- which is demonstrably false.
Additionally the cult wants to demand that being punished for killing
Lisa McPherson some how adversely impacts 'the free exercise rights
of the Church and its members...' That means they fully intend to
carry on with the quack medicine and practicing of medicine without a
license; something which has resulted in a lot of deaths so far.
But what's also very interesting -- and amusing -- is the fact that the
bad guys accurately cover the lost revenues that prosecution for their
killings cause due to the pre-innoculation of other victims that such
media coverage does. Sounds rather like the tobacco industry, huh?
You'll also note that the Scientology cult tries to enact the RFRA
while claiming that the State has no compelling interest in bringing
felony charges against the cult in this homicide. Keeping the cult
from killing other victims wouldn't be a "compelling interest," it
would seem.
What's also interesting is that the crooks admit in this bizarre
court submission is that they're still using the quack medicine
device they call an "e-meter" -- which is nothing but a wheatstone
bridge. The crooks were slapped down for this in decades past and yet
here they are again engaged in the same quack medicine claims -- and
admitting it in a court document.
And note that there's not a single comment about the fact that Lisa
was going to leave the cult and that she repeatedly tried to escape
from her captors, screaming and fighting with them, and, according
to the crook's own records, repeatedly told her captors that they
were going to kill her. There's not a single word about her cry for
help by staging an accident and asking police and ambulance workers
to help her and listen to her.
It's a damn shame that the crooks that came up with this "motion to
dismiss" can't be held criminally liable for the uncountable lies
it contains. One may lie to the court in such documents as much as
one wants in America.
--BEGIN QUOTE--
STATE OF FLORIDA, Case No. CRC 98-20377 CFANO-S
vs.
MOTION TO DISMISS
THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG INFORMATION BASED UPON
SERVICE ORGANIZATION "RFRA" AND THE FIRST
SPNNO. 01980179 AMENDMENT
____________________________/ ("RFRA BRIEF')
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION BASED UPON "RFRA" AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, and MEMORANDUM OF LAW
The Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. ("The Church"
or "FSO"), respectfully moves this Honorable Court to enter an order
dismissing Counts One and Two of the Information and as good grounds
therefore would show:
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The criminal charges brought against the Church of Scientology Flag
Service Organization ("The Church" or "FSO") are virtually unprecedented
in the history of the United States. In no reported case since the
founding of the Republic was a church, as opposed to its individual
representatives, convicted of a crime. Indeed, with one minor and
ill-chosen exception, in no reported case was a church even charged
with a criminal offense.1
No one, of course, would claim that this dramatic precedent (or, more
precisely, lack of precedent) merely reflects that church leaders,
ministers, priests, rabbis, or other ecclesiastical officials have
never strayed from the paths of righteousness and lawful conduct.
_______________
1 In the single exception, People v. Murphy, 98 Misc.2d 235,
413 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Queens Cty. 1977), the court dismissed the
indictment under the First Amendment.
-=-
Rather, it demonstrates a wise and careful historical understanding
and practice, compelled by constitutional limitation, that the State's
interest in enforcing its criminal laws is sufficiently protected by
bringing charges against the individuals directly responsible for the
acts involved, and that religious liberty compels that the State not
become entangled in charging and punishing churches (and ultimately
their parishioners) for such acts.
Indeed, this historical and unbroken understanding and practice has
recently been followed even by the Pinellas County State Attorney. In
State of Florida v. Henry Lyons, CRC 98-03449 CFANO-S, the State
Attorney prosecuted Reverend Henry Lyons, the former President of
the National Baptist Convention, for a variety of serious crimes, but
did not charge the Baptist Convention, despite the fact that Reverend
Lyons was the Convention's most senior official and that the Convention
explicitly ratified and affirmed the acts of Reverend Lyons. Yet the
very same State Attorney's office has chosen to indict the Church
alone, to the exclusion of the individual actors, all but one of whom
were granted immunity. Indeed, even the members of the Church's board
of directors were granted immunity. How the State Attorney can reconcile
such a prosecution with his actions in the Lyons case, let alone with
the historical precedent in this State and Nation, is a question that,
we submit, he cannot properly answer.
The State Attorney's burden is made all the more insurmountable by the
Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998 ("RFRA"), Section
761.01-.05, Florida Statutes. RFRA was enacted to buttress the
protections of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and
of Section 3, Article I of the Florida Constitution. It provides that
the State may not impose burdens upon a church's exercise of religion
except in furtherance of a compelling state interest, and even then
only by the least restrictive means necessary to protect that state
__________________________________________________________________________
interest. Florida's RFRA together with established doctrine under the
speech, assembly and religion clauses of the First Amendment, compels
dismissal of the criminal charges brought against the Church in this
case, for several reasons.
First, the threat or imposition of a criminal conviction and criminal
penalties imposes immense burdens upon a church and its individual
parishioners, within the meaning of RFRA and the First Amendment. A
church, whatever its legal formalities, is much more than the mere
legal fiction of a corporate entity, but rather is an organic body of
believers and followers. It is through a church that the followers
pursue and achieve salvation in accordance with their religious beliefs.
To label a church a criminal is to taint the entire religion and its
members, to burden its evangelical mission, and to cast it into public
disfavor. To impose financial penalties or disabilities upon it is to
penalize the members and parishioners who support its mission, and to
transform their contributions to a use not intended or authorized.
Because this prosecution of a church substantially burdens the free
exercise rights of the Church and its members, it can be undertaken
consistent with RFRA and the First Amendment only if it furthers a
compelling government interest by the means least restrictive of RFRA
and First Amendment rights. Logic and history dictate a negative
conclusion to both inquiries. The government's compelling interest
lies in enforcing compliance with its criminal laws; only individuals
can comply or not comply with such laws. A church, or any other
corporation, can only act through individuals, and the criminal law,
with its ultimate sanction of imprisonment, is most effectively
directed at individuals, not corporations and especially not churches.
While the government ordinarily may and sometimes does proceed
criminally against corporations, under statutes specifically crafted to
punish acts that create illicit corporate profits,
__________________________________________________________________________
it cannot be said that its interest in doing so, as opposed to the
individual malefactors, is compelling (as opposed to merely reasonable)
in the constitutional sense. It certainly cannot be said to be a
compelling interest where the corporation is a non-profit organization,
especially a church, where the statutes pursuant to which the charges
are brought are directed at individual conduct, and where the charge
and ultimate penalty will harm the contributors and members, and not
the malefactors, especially, as here, when the State Attorney has
chosen not to prosecute the malefactors for their acts.
In any event, the means by which the government may further its interest
in enforcing the criminal laws that is least restrictive of religious
free exercise is to limit its focus to the individual actors. It is by
no means necessary for the government to taint and burden an entire
church and religion and virtually all its parishioners in order to
enforce its laws. We can conclude with certainty that this is true
from the historical fact that no church has ever suffered criminal
conviction in the history of this State and Nation. And yet the Republic
still stands.
Second, it must be emphasized that the criminal information in this
case charges the Church with criminal liability for certain acts of
individuals that were undertaken pursuant to their deeply held religious
belief and that constituted the exercise of religious practice. Thus,
it is part of the religious beliefs of Scientology that mental or
"psychotic" conditions are spiritual in nature, and must be addressed
by spiritual means. Use of psychiatric care or psychiatric hospitals
is strictly forbidden as a fundamental tenet of Scientology, just as
it is a fundamental tenet of the Christian Science religion to abjure
medical treatment for physical ailments. Lisa McPherson herself
strongly adhered to these religious beliefs when she rejected
psychiatric treatment at Morton Plant Hospital and chose personally
instead to receive spiritual assistance at FSO. The
__________________________________________________________________________
acts of various Church staff members - who themselves were members
of a religious order2 and had dedicated their lives to Scientology -
in attempting to provide spiritual assistance, not medical treatment,
to Lisa McPherson was a matter of religious choice and belief, by
them and by Ms. McPherson. Such choices as to the free exercise of
one's religious beliefs are protected activity under RFRA and the
First Amendment. The State's effort to redefine the spiritual
assistance provided to Lisa McPherson as the improper practice of
medicine or the abuse of a disabled adult impermissibly burdens the
religious practices, and cannot be justified under the strict
scrutiny mandated by RFRA.
Third, the criminal information criminally charges the Church on
a vicarious liability basis for the alleged negligent acts of certain
staff members in failing on a timely basis to recognize that Ms.
McPherson had developed serious physical medical symptoms and to
bring her to a hospital on time. These negligent acts were in violation
of Scientology scripture stating that medical assistance should be
sought for physical ailments, where needed. It is particularly odious
under RFRA and the First Amendment for the State to charge a church
with a crime under what in effect are respondeat superior principles
of agency usually applied to secular relationships and business
corporations. It is improper for a civil court to impose upon a
church secular models of employment, supervision or care with respect
to ecclesiastical functions and duties of church staff.
"Bureaucratic suggestion in employment decisions of a pastoral
character, in contravention of a church's own perception of its
needs and purposes, would constitute unprecedented entanglement
_______________
2 All staff members of FSO are members of a Scientology
religious order known as the "Sea Organization" or "Sea
Org." Members of the order dedicate their lives to working
to further the religious goals of Scientology religion;
indeed, they agree to so dedicate themselves for the next
billion years, pursuant to Scientology's religious belief
in successive lives and transmigration of the spirit.
See Affidavit of Richard Reiss, ¶2.
__________________________________________________________________________
with religious authority." Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1020 (1986). See Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of
New Orleans, 32 F.3d 953, 960 (5th Cir. 1994) (Church not liable
for failure to supervise when employee engages in independent criminal
conduct which results in plaintiffs injuries); Doe v. Evans, 718 So.
2d 286, 290-91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (First Amendment prohibits court
from considering claims of negligent hiring, retention or supervision
by the Church).
At the least, if a church can ever be charged criminally, despite
all that we have said above, it can only be where the Church itself
clearly can be found to have authorized or directed the acts alleged.
See State v. Municipal Auto Sales, 222 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 3rd
DCA 1969) (applying such a rule even to business corporations). The
Supreme Court of the United States has mandated such a rule with
respect to mere civil liability of political associations. NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916-920 (1982). In Claiborne
Hardware the Supreme Court recognized that imposition of even civil
liability could destroy an organization engaged in vitally protected
speech and association, and, in doing so, burden or destroy such
protected activity. Accordingly, liability would be limited to those
unlawful acts that were authorized, directed or ratified by the
organization itself. The Claiborne Hardware principle applies a
fortiori to a church, which enjoys the added protection of the
religion clauses and of RFRA. Here, the negligent acts were not
authorized, and indeed were contrary to Church scripture.
Moreover, to avoid the First Amendment's prohibition of judicial
entanglement into matters of religious "discipline, faith, internal
organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law," Serbian ilivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976), the court
__________________________________________________________________________
must defer to the Church itself to define and establish the meaning
and interpretation of religious doctrine; the court "may [not look]
behind the declared content of religious beliefs anymore than [it]
may examine into their validity." Holy Spirit Association for the
Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Committee of City of New
York, 55 N.Y.2d 512, 521 (1982). See Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450
(1969).
Indeed, the virtually impenetrable thicket into which courts would
enter if they tried to sort outwhat acts are compelled by, authorized,
permitted, discouraged or prohibited by church doctrine demonstrates
both the advisability and constitutional correctness of our principal
point, to wit, that criminal prosecutions of churches, qua churches,
are both unnecessary and impermissible under RFRA and the First Amendment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The Defendant Is A Church
The defendant Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization is a
church of the Scientology religion that provides advanced religious
training and counseling in Clearwater to Scientologists from
throughout the world. Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization
v. City of Clearwater, 2F.3d 1514, 1519-20 (11th Cir. 1993). The
Internal Revenue Service has recognized the defendant as a "church,"
within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §170(c), exempt from taxation under
26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3). See Internal Revenue Service, Cumulative List
of Organizations Described in Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, Publication 78 (revised 2-98), Supp. No. 1998-1.
The defendant, however, is much more than an ordinary Church of
the Scientology
__________________________________________________________________________
religion. Most Scientology churches are dedicated to providing basic
Scientology religious services, denominated auditing and training, to
Scientologists located in the geographical area of each particular
Church itself. FSO, however, provides what is known as advanced
auditing and training services that not available at the local
churches, and, in many instances, are available nowhere else in the
world. It is the goal of every Scientologist to advance beyond the
basic Scientology services available at the local churches, and to
participate in the higher or "upper" level services available at
FSO. Thus, FSO is undoubtedly the most important single Scientology
church to every Scientologist in the world. Its parishioners, or
potential parishioners, include every adherent to the Scientology
religion. Affidavit of Mary Story ¶4. It is analogous to Mecca or
to the wailing wall, and indeed is referred to in Scientology as "the
Mecca of Scientology." Id.
2. The Religion of Scientology
The Church has submitted with this motion the affidavit of Reverend
Richard Reiss. Reverend Reiss, who is a graduate of both Yale and
Oxford Universities and completed four years of graduate work in
Philosophy at Rockefeller University, is the Senior Case Supervisor
at FSO. Reiss Aff., ¶ 5. As such, he is "the senior-most ecclesiastical
authority in the FSO, responsible for the spiritual guidance and
advancement of all parishioners of that Church." Reiss Aff., ¶ 4.
His description of Scientology religious beliefs and practices is
thus completely authoritative.
The purpose of the Reiss affidavit is to set forth in definitive
fashion the nature and contents of the basic beliefs and practices
of the Scientology religion, both generally and, in particular,
with respect to spiritual treatment of mental conditions and the
religion's prohibition upon psychiatric treatment. While we summarize
here significant portions ofRev. Reiss'
__________________________________________________________________________
affidavit, we urge the Court to review the Affidavit in its entirety
to obtain a full understanding of the Church's beliefs and practices.
In considering the showing made in Rev. Reiss's affidavit, the Court
should not be drawn into attempting its own interpretation of church
belief and practice, lest it run afoul of the non-entanglement
doctrine of the establishment clause of the First Amendment. It is
not for a secular court to engage in an exegesis of religious
scripture. "The First Amendment prohibits civil courts from ...
determin[ing] matters at the very core of a religion - the
interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance
of those doctrines to the religion." Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
450 (1969). Rather, the First Amendment requires courts to defer
to the ecclesiastical position of the Church itself with respect
to the meaning and interpretation of the religious doctrine. Neither
the State nor the Court is free to inquire whether or not the
Church's interpretation of its dogma presented through the Reiss
affidavit, is the "correct" one. Such an inquiry, in itself, would
violate the requirements of the First Amendment. Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976). In the words ofthe New
York Court of Appeals:
Neither the courts nor the administrative agencies of the state or
its subdivisions may go behind the declared content of religious
beliefs any more than they may examine their validity. ... It is for
religious bodies themselves, rather than the courts or administrative
agencies, to define, by their teachings and activities, what their
religion is.
Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity.
v. Tax Comm. of the City of New York, 55 N.Y. 2d 512, 521, 521-528
(1982); Accord, Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
("excessive governmental entanglement with religion will occur if a
court is
__________________________________________________________________________
required to interpret church law, policies, or practices; therefore,
the First Amendment prohibits such an inquiry"), quoting with
approval L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d 674, 563 N.W.2d 434, 440
(Wis. 1997).
Even apart from any constitutional consideration, "[S]ound policy
dictates that the denominations, and not the courts interpret their
own body of church polity." Wheeler v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Boston, 378 Mass. 58, 64, 389 N.E. 2d 966, 969 (1979). Courts lack
the expertise to engage in revisionist interpretations of religious
dogma. It is difficult to see how a judicial interpretation would
aid in determining how such dogma is understood by church members,
who look to the church, not the courts, for scriptural guidance.
As Rev. Reiss's affidavit makes clear, Scientology is based upon
the research, writings and recorded lectures of its Founder, L. Ron
Hubbard, which collectively constitute the scripture of the religion.
The scripture "is the sole source of all the doctrines, tenets,
philosophy, practices, rituals and fundamental policies of the
Scientology faith." See Reiss Aff., ¶ 6.
The ultimate aim of Scientology is a civilization without insanity,
crime or war. Id., ¶ 7. Scientologists believe that by converting
persons to Scientology and bringing them to a high level of spiritual
awareness and ability they can salvage civilization and achieve that
goal. Id, ¶ 8.
The basic tenet of Scientology is that man is an immortal spirit
who has lived though a great many lifetimes and who has the
potential for infinite survival. Although he has a mind and a
body, he is himself a spiritual being called a "thetan." Id, ¶ 10.
"The thetan is inherently good, with infinite spiritual capability.
However, over the ages, and as a result of becoming enmeshed with
the material universe, thetans have lost their true spiritual
identity and
__________________________________________________________________________
operate at a small fraction of their native ability. The goal of
Scientology is to return a thetan to his 'native state' -- the
state of being he had at inception as a thetan." Id., ¶ 11.
The principal religious practices in Scientology are "auditing"
and "training." Id., ¶¶ 31, et seq. The purpose of auditing and
training is to unburden the thetan of past painful experiences
from his present and past lifetimes, which exist in the form of
"engrams" in the "reactive mind"3 of the individual. "While a
thetan may be in the present, the sources of his troubles are a
manifestation of his past. Only through exploration and examination
of his past can he overcome the negative experiences that are
affecting him today and reducing his inherent spiritual ability."
Id., ¶ 22.
"Scientology auditing is based on the principle that if an
individual looks at his own existence, he can improve his ability
to confront what he is and where he is." Id., ¶ 34. By doing so
the spiritual being is helped to rid himself of past negative
experience, effecting a full realization of his spiritual potential
and thus increasing his abilities as a spiritual being. Id. "Through
Scientology training one obtains the wisdom to understand who he is,
what he is, where he comes from and his relationship to the universe."
Id., ¶ 31.
Auditing and training are provided in a progression of specific
steps which result in graduated increases in spiritual enlightenment.
Id., ¶¶ 29-30, 39. This progression is represented by Scientology's
"Bridge to Total Freedom." Id., ¶ 29, 39. Ultimately the thetan
recovers "his full spiritual ability," id., ¶ 30, "realizes his
full spiritual potential and increases his abilities as a
_______________
3 As Rev. Reiss explains, "the mind records data using
what are called 'mental image pictures."' Id. ¶ 22. Mental
image pictures of "moments of pain and partial or full
unconsciousness ... are called 'engrams'" and are stored
in what is called the "reactive mind." Id. "The thetan is
not aware of [engrams]" in his reactive mind, but they
affect his "behavior and are the source of all irrationality,
fear, and psychosomatic illness. Engrams... can be
'restimulated' by events in one's present environment."
Id., ¶ 24.
__________________________________________________________________________
spiritual being." Id., ¶ 34. Scientologists believe that as enough
people are audited to such upper levels of spiritual awareness, the
goal of a new civilization without war, crime and insanity will be
achieved. Id, ¶ 7-8. Scientology ministers use a device called an
E-meter to guide parishioners during auditing and training to assist
them in locating their precise areas of spiritual difficulty. Id., ¶ 38.
In Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1989), the Supreme
Court described Scientology's beliefs and practices in terms which
clearly recognized their religious nature:
Scientologists believe that an immortal spiritual being exists in
every person. A person becomes aware of this spiritual dimension
through a process known as "auditing." Auditing involves a one-to-one
encounter between a participant (known as a "preclear") and a Church
official (known as an "auditor"). An electronic device, the E-meter,
helps the auditor identify the preclear's areas of spiritual
difficulty by measuring skin responses during a question and answer
session. ... The preclear gains spiritual awareness by progressing
through sequential levels of auditing...
Due to the charges in this case, it is necessary to briefly describe
Scientology beliefs and practices with respect to spiritual healing
of what are commonly referred to as "mental conditions," psychiatric
treatment, and medical care.
Scientologists believe that what is referred to as mental illness in
our society is a spiritual problem, and must be addressed exclusively
by spiritual means. Reiss Aff., ¶¶ 48-50. In the case of certain kinds
of severe psychotic behavior, denominated in Scientology as "PTS Type
III" (id., ¶ 55)4 the necessary spiritual process is called the
"Introspection Rundown." Id., ¶¶ 57-
_______________
4 "PTS Type III" behavior includes the following: "A Type III
may carry on absurd conversations with himself, become violent
toward others in his vicinity and become self-destructive. He
may believe he is surrounded by demons ... [He] thinks he is
somewhere else (or many other (continued...)
__________________________________________________________________________
60. Initially, the person should be provided with a restful,
non-harassive environment, with no outside stimulation, and plenty
of food and water. As Mr. Hubbard wrote: "The task ... is to provide
a relatively safe environment and quiet and rest and no treatment
of a mental nature at all." Id., ¶ 56. Co-religionists should watch
the person exhibiting "Type III" behavior on a twenty-four hour
basis to ensure that she does not injure herself, and to provide
food, water, and, if appropriate, non-prescription over-the-counter
vitamins, minerals, and sedatives5 to induce sleep. Id. Occasionally,
aspirin is used, not because of its medicinal qualities, but because
it has been found to he helpful in stopping the individual from
reexperiencing "mental image pictures" from past lives. Id., ¶ 46,
61(I). "Since the PTS Type III is a thetan being overwhelmed by his
mental image pictures, use of aspirin may be recommended since the
first area of spiritual address is to calm the person down
sufficiently so that he can rest to participate in auditing procedures
to fully address the spiritual cause of his condition." Id., ¶ 61(I).
Only when the person progresses sufficiently so that he or she no
longer exhibits "Type III" behavior is auditing provided to help
facilitate further spiritual progress. The Introspection Rundown
itself is an entirely religious process. See Reiss Aff., ¶¶ 57-60.
As we show, post, the Church staff members who assisted Lisa
McPherson from November 18 - December 5, 1995 believed she was
experiencing "PTS Type III" behavior, and attempted to provide to
her the spiritual and religious assistance that she requested and
that was appropriate within the Scientology religion.
The writings of Mr. Hubbard stress that while the Introspection
Rundown is a
_______________
4 (... continued) places all at once) ... He may think he
is somebody else (or many other persons all at once) ..."
Reiss Aff., ¶ 55.
5 Prescription sedatives may be used if prescribed by a
doctor. Reiss Aff, ¶ 56.
__________________________________________________________________________
purely religious matter, a medical doctor should be consulted, if
necessary, for any physical ailments that may arise. See Reiss
Aff., ¶¶ 56, 61(G). There is no religious prohibition in Scientology
upon medical treatment by doctors for physical ailments and
conditions, and parishioners suffering medical conditions are
encouraged to see a doctor. Id., ¶¶ 44-45. Indeed, "it is a
Scientology religious belief that a person suffering from a
physical ailment is hindered from making spiritual progress
in auditing and training, and thus such a person is encouraged
to seek medical help so that his spiritual progress may resume."
Id., ¶ 44. It also, however, is a Scientology belief that
participation in auditing will assist a parishioner in recovering
from or preventing the spiritual causes or effects of medical
conditions in a way that complements traditional medicine. Thus,
the Creed of the Church of Scientology states: "We of the Church
believe that the spirit can be saved and that the spirit alone
may [save] or heal the body." Id.
Under no circumstances, however, may resort be had to psychiatric
treatment, to which the Church is firmly opposed as a matter of
religious belief and philosophy. Id., ¶¶ 13-19, 48-49.
This prohibition is based on the fundamental belief that the real
cause of man's ills is spiritual in nature and cannot be resolved by
psychological and psychiatric forms of treatment. Indeed,
Scientologists believe those treatments alter or permanently damage
the body (i.e., drugs, electric shock, lobotomy) and render any
spiritual improvement impossible. Direct communication to the thetan
in the physical universe takes place through the body. If the
communication route from the body to the thetan and from the thetan
to the body is permanently damaged, it can permanently bar the
practice of Scientology to help the individual regain his spiritual
freedom.
Id., ¶ 19. Accordingly, the Creed of the Church of Scientology
states: "that the study of the mind and the healing of mentally
caused ills should not be alienated fiom religion or condoned in
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nonreligous fields." Id., ¶ 14.
To summarize:
1. The exclusive method of spiritually assisting a person
exhibiting "Type III" behavior is the Introspection Rundown.
The person is provided with a calm, restful, quiet
environment, plenty of food, vitamins and water, and
encouraged to sleep. Medical doctors should be consulted
if physical symptoms of illness develop. When the parishioner
no longer exhibits Type III behavior, auditing is utilized
to further spiritual progress.
2. Churches of Scientology ministers or staff members are
prohibited from recommending or facilitating psychiatric treatment
of Scientologists. Rather, they should assist Scientologists to
seek Scientology spiritual counseling, such as the kind of
treatment described in paragraph 1 above.
3. Churches of Scientology ministers or staff members do not
attempt to treat medical conditions. Parishioners are encouraged
to consult licensed medical doctors for any manifest or apparent
physical ailments, or for any medical treatment.
3. The Charges Leveled by the State
The felony information contains two counts. Count One alleges that
the Church "did knowingly, willfully, or by culpable negligence
abuse and/or neglect a disabled adult" during the period of November
18 - December 5, 1995, inclusive, thereby causing "permanent
disfigurement, permanent disability or great bodily harm to Lisa
McPherson," in violation of Chapter 825.102 (1995) Florida Statutes.
Count Two alleges that the Church during the same time period "did
practice medicine or attempt to practice medicine" without a license
by "the diagnosis, treatment, operation or prescription for any
human disease, pain, injury, deformity or
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other physical and mental condition in reference to Lisa McPherson"
(emphasis added), in violation of Chapter 458.327 (1995) Florida
Statutes.
The information itself contains no particulars, but attached to it
is an affidavit of Special Agent A. L. Strope of the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE") which sets forth the purported
basis for the charges. The affidavit, like the information itself,
makes clear that the charges are based upon the entire course of
conduct engaged in by members and staff members of FSO from November
18, 1995 through and until Ms. McPherson's death on December 5, 1995.
Yet the affidavit does not identify any physical manifestations of
illness as occurring until December 1, 1995, four days before Lisa
McPherson's death.
Rather, Special Agent Strope repeatedly emphasizes that a central
focus of the charges concerns the efforts of various Church staff
members to provide spiritual assistance for what they determined to
be Lisa McPherson's "PTS Type III" condition, and their failure to
refer or bring Ms. McPherson to a psychiatrist or psychiatric
hospital for treatment of her "psychotic" condition. In so doing,
the staff members were following their strongly held religious
beliefs and practices, as well as the religious choice made by Ms.
McPherson herself. Indeed, it is manifest from the Strope affidavit,
when read in conjunction with Rev. Reiss's affidavit describing
Scientology religious beliefs and practices, that every act undertaken
by every FSO staff member was done precisely and exclusively to
provide spiritual and religious assistance and help to Lisa McPherson,
and not to provide medical treatment.
Thus, the Strope affidavit states that on November 18, 1995, Ms.
McPherson was in an automobile accident in Clearwater, following
which she began to walk down the street without her clothes. The
medical personnel at the scene of the accident "became concerned for
__________________________________________________________________________
Lisa's psychological [not physical] well-being" and took her to
Morton Plant Hospital (Strope, p. 3). Strope further recounts that
"despite the fact that [attendingl Dr. Lovett felt that Lisa was in
need of psychological treatment," she was released from the hospital
because attending psychiatric Nurse Joe Price "did not believe
McPherson met the criteria for involuntary hospitalization." Id.
(emphasis added).
Indeed, Agent Strope omitted from his affidavit reference to several
passages from the Morton Plant Hospital records that make clear that
Lisa McPherson herself chose to leave the hospital, and to participate
in Scientology spiritual assistance for her "condition." They also
make clear that Ms. McPherson was completely aware of what she was
doing and that she was entirely competent to make her decision.
Thus, the report of Nurse Price, upon which Agent Strope relied,
stated the reasons for Nurse Price's conclusion that Ms. McPherson
should be permitted to leave the hospital. Nurse Price found that
Ms. McPherson retained the "ability to abstract thinking" [sic] and
that her "cognition [was] intact." See Aff. of Glen Stilo, ¶ 6, and
Ex. B. He further reported that Ms. McPherson stated, "I want to go
home [with] my friends from the congregation." Id.
Even more important, Agent Strope omitted from his affidavit
reference to critical portions of the report of Dr. Lovett, the
attending physician. Dr. Lovett wrote:
The psychiatric liaison, Joe, evaluated the patient and feels that
she is not a danger to herself or others. We feel that she does have
a psychiatric problem. The patient does not want to stay in the
hospital. Her friends at Scientology will watch her twenty-four hours
a dav and be sure that she gets the care that they want her to have
and the patient wants to have. I told them that I felt this was okay.
The patient does not want to stay in the hospital, and we will not
Baker Act her to do this.
__________________________________________________________________________
I spoke to Dr. Dajani on the phone. He feels the patient is not a
harm to herself or to others. She cannot be Baker Acted I will have
the patient sign out against medical advice. I told her I could not
be responsible for actions, and I felt that she was able to make a
rationale decision at this time. Again, the Scientology group will
observe her very closely and will give her whatever care that they
want to do for this problem she is having.
Diagnoses: (1) No evidence of acute medical problem or injury.
(2) Behavioral dysfunction.
davit of Glen Stilo, ¶ 7 and Ex. C (emphasis added).
Thus, the determination of the medical personnel at Morton Plant
Hospital was unanimous in finding: (1) Lisa McPherson did not wish
to stay in the hospital, (2) Lisa McPherson chose to go with her
co-religionists, who would provide the spiritual "care" she "wants
to have;" (3) that "care" included a twenty-four hour watch, and
thus Ms. McPherson and her co-religionists clearly contemplated that
she would be provided the Introspection Rundown, the Scientology
religious practice for providing spiritual assistance for "PTS Type
III" behavior; and (4) Lisa McPherson retained her abilities for
cognitive and abstract thinking, and was "able to make a rational
decision" to choose spiritual care over psychiatric treatment. Yet
it is from the date of Ms. McPherson's release from Morton Plant
Hospital for such spiritual treatment for her "psychological" condition
that the felony charges are brought.
Agent Strope's affidavit repeatedly emphasizes the "severity of
Lisa's mental illness" (Strope at 6) and that the Church's staff
members continued to attempt to provide assistance to her for
that condition rather than sending her for "psychological help."
Id. at 6, 9. Each and every aspect of the assistance Strope
identifies is part of the Church's religious practices with respect
to spiritual assistance to parishioners exhibiting "PTS Type III"
behavior. Thus,
__________________________________________________________________________
Strope acknowledges that the Scientologists who were watching Lisa
twenty-four hours a day6 considered her to be PTS "Type Three." Id.
at 9. Compare Reiss Aff. ¶¶ 56, 60. He describes her as being "severely
psychotic" by the second day (Strope Aff. at 7), and her behavior
as "hyperactive, delusiohal, and hallucinating." Id., at 8. She "engaged
in self-destructive behavior," "had conversations with people who were
not there, claimed to be people she was not, sang and danced, ...
crawled around on the floor, stood on the toilet, got in the shower
fully clothed, tried to walk out of the room in a state of undress,
and on at least one occasion drank her own urine." Id. at 8-9.
Compare Reiss Aff. at ¶ 55 (describing "Type III" behavior).
The acts that Strope alleges come within the criminal charges in
this case constitute the efforts of the Scientologists with Lisa
McPherson to provide her with spiritual and religious assistance,
known as the Introspection Rundown, for her "Type III" behavior -
all of which was consistent with the religious beliefs of Lisa
McPherson and all of her co-religionists who stayed with her. According
to Agent Strope, Ms. McPherson "was undergoing an isolation watch,
in the hope that her condition would improve and stabilize, so she
could undergo a Scientology procedure known as an introspection
rundown." Strope Aff. at 9. Compare Reiss Aff., ¶¶ 56-60. Accordingly,
and pursuant to Scientology practices (as stated by Strope), she was
_______________
6 Strope repeatedly uses terminology designed to give the
incorrect impression that the FSO staff members were trying
to treat Lisa medically. Thus, he refers to the watchers
as "caretakers" or "caregivers," in a transparent effort to
try to come within the scope of § 825.101, Florida Statutes.
Yet, the individuals in no way were there to provide medical
care or treatment; they were there to assist in a
spiritual/religious process. Reiss Aff., ¶¶ 56-60. Similarly,
Agent Strope refers to Alan Kartuzinski as Lisa's "case
supervisor," but does not explain that that term in
Scientology refers to the person who supervises a
parishioner's participation in the spiritual practices and
processes of Scientology, including the handling of"PTS Type
III" conditions. It is purely concerned with religious
practice, not corporate decisions, and carries no suggestion
or implication of supervision over medical treatment, because
the Church does not provide or claim to provide medical
treatment. Reiss Aff, ¶¶ 40, 41.
__________________________________________________________________________
"watched on a 24 hour basis," Strope Aff. at 6, isolated, kept in
a quiet environment, and restrained when she became violent or
self-destructive. Id. at 7. 7 Compare Reiss Aff, ¶¶ 56, 59-60.
She was encouraged to sleep, given vitamins, water, and aspirin
and benadryl to help her sleep. Strope Aff. at 11-12. Compare Reiss
Aff., ¶¶ 56, 59, 61. These acts were addressed exclusively to what
Strope describes as Ms. McPherson's "mental illness," and were, as
Rev. Reiss' affidavit shows, pursuant to the religious beliefs of
the staff members and Ms McPherson. Even here, it is clear from
the Strope affidavit that the decision as to what sleep inducer
to give her was grounded exclusively in religious considerations.
In his affidavit, Strope recounts that Alain Kartuzinski - Lisa
McPherson's Case Supervisor and the staff member in charge of her
spiritual treatment at the Church - "forb[a]de the use of the
Valium prescribed by Dr. Minkoff because he felt it might prevent
the use of further Scientology procedures on Lisa" and "directed,
after checking Scientology references, that aspirin be included as
it might assist in blocking Lisa's formation of mental images."8
Strope Aff at 12 (emphasis added). Compare Reiss Aff., at ¶ 61(I).
In contrast to his emphasis on Lisa McPherson's psychological
condition, Strope does not identifjy any serious physical symptoms
as arising until December 1, 1995, when Lisa's extremities were
cool but not cold." Strope Aff at 14. Janis Johnson, the Church's
medical
_______________
7 Agent Strope alleges that the Church's staff members
"never attempted to contact Ljsa's next-of-kin," Strope
Aff. at 8, presumably in support of the charge of
abuse or neglect. Yet he fails to note that the hospital
records he acknowledges to have consulted show that Ms.
McPherson identified as her next-of-kin "Benetta
Slaughter," her friend, employer, and co-religionist, who
was fully aware of the events at issue. See Affidavit of
Glen Stilo, ¶ 8 and Ex. D. Thus, the FSO staff members
were merely honoring Lisa McPherson's own choice as to
whom she might wish to be contacted.
"The "mental images" referred to in the Strope affidavit
are "mental image pictures" in the "reactive mind". Reiss
Aff., ¶¶ 22, 24.
__________________________________________________________________________
liaison officer, "noticed Lisa's health declining and that she had
lost weight the Friday [Dec. 1] before her death." Id. at 15. By
Saturday, some reports of those watching Lisa indicate she was "too
weak to walk" but that she subsequently "regained some of her
strength." Id. at 16. The last three days she was "not ...active."
Id. By the evening of the 4th or the morning of the 5th, Johnson
was concerned, and stated she would take her to the hospital. Id.
By 5 p.m. of December 5, Johnson was notified "that something was
wrong." Johnson did not take Lisa to the nearest hospital, and
did not arrive at the hospital in New Port Richey until about 9:30,
by which time Lisa had died. Strope alleges that the delay in
bringing Lisa to the hospital "deprived [her] of her only opportunity
for survival." Id. at 17.
Strope emphasizes the role of Janis Johnson. While Johnson
previously had been licensed as a doctor in Arizona, her license
had lapsed in 1994. Id. at 11. Johnson's staff position was not as
a medical doctor; rather, as Strope acknowledges, she was the
Church's Assistant Medical Liaison officer, whose job, according
to Strope, was to be "responsible for handling staff employees in
their dealings with health related professionals." Id.at 11 (emphasis
added).
Thus, Johnson's responsibility was to liaise with medical
professionals, when necessary, and not to provide medical care.
Strope notes twice that Johnson assumed control of Lisa's isolation
watch, telling others to "butt out." Id. at 11, 13. Strope's
affidavit charges that Johnson consulted with a licensed medical
doctor, Dr. Minkoff, who was not a Church staff member but who
was a practicing Scientologist, and administered or ordered shots
of magnesium chloride and chloral hydrate to McPherson to induce sl
eep. Id. at 13-15. Minkoff, in fact, specifically prescribed the
chloral hydrate for Lisa McPherson. Id. at 9-10. Neither Johnson
nor Minkoff have been criminally charged, and the latter was granted
immunity.
__________________________________________________________________________
Thus, the only allegations that Lisa McPherson's physical condition
was not properly attended to concern the period December 1-5, 1995.
Strope's allegations with respect to Lisa's physical condition
consist of charges that Johnson assumed control of the situation,
that she was not licensed to practice medicine in Florida, that she
ignored the physical manifestations of illness for several days,
and that she was negligent in bringing Ms. McPherson to the hospital
on time. He further alleges that Johnson administered injections of
magnesium chloride without a prescription, and that Dr. Minkoff
prescribed chloral hydrate without observing Lisa. With respect to
none of these allegations can or does Strope allege that Johnson
or Minkoff were acting according to instructions or directions of
the Church or in accordance with Church policy, precepts or
beliefs. Rather, the allegations are of negligence or of unauthorized
acts on the part of Johnson and maybe Minkoff. Yet Johnson has not
been charged, and Minkoff was granted immunity. Only the Church has
been prosecuted, on a vicarious liability theory for the acts of
these individuals.
ARGUMENT
I. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF THE CHURCH FOR THE ACTS OF ITS
STAFF MEMBERS VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES; SECTION 3, ARTICLE I OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION; AND FLORIDA RFRA
Florida's Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") bars criminal
prosecution of the Church in this case. Specifically, the
unprecedented act of prosecuting the Church criminally cannot
survive RFRA because there is no compelling state interest in
pursuing the charges against the Church, and because prosecution
of the individuals, rather than the entire church organization,
is a less restrictive means to achieve any governmental interest.
__________________________________________________________________________
A. Florida's RFRA Applies To The Criminal Prosecution Of The Church
RFRA prohibits governmental actions, such as the prosecution of
the Church here, that substantially burden the exercise of religion
and are not the least restrictive means for the government to
advance a compelling governmental interest:
[G]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except that government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person:
(a) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
Fla. Stat. §761.03 (1998).
Florida RFRA became law on June 17, 1998. It is virtually identical
to the United States Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Federal
RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.9 Both Florida RFRA and Federal
RFRA were enacted in response to the United States Supreme Court
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which abandoned the strict
scrutiny test10 applicable to certain claims brought
_______________
9 The Federal RFRA was held unconstitutional as applied to
the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, _U.S._ 117 S.Ct.
2157 (1997) on the ground that Congress lacked power to so
legislate with respect to the states. In response, Florida
enacted its own RFRA.
10 "Strict scrutiny" review - requiring a governmental entity
to justify its actions by a compelling state interest and to
show that the actions are the least restrictive means to further
that interest - is reserved for cases where the government
actions impinge upon fundamental constitutional rights, such
as freedom of speech, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), or further an invidious
discrimination based upon a suspect classification such as
race, nationality, or alienage. E.g., Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944). If "strict scrutiny" is not applicable,
government actions will withstand constitutional scrutiny
(continued...)
__________________________________________________________________________
exclusively under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States." The purpose of Florida's
RFRA legislation was, "to establish the compelling interest test
[strict scrutiny review] as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened, and to provide a claim or
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially
burdened by government." Chapter 98-412, 1998 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. (West 1998) (emphasis added).
As explained by the Supreme Court in Sherbert, strict scrutiny
review permits restrictions on religious liberties only in the
most extreme cases. The Court held, "it is basic that no showing
merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest
would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion
for permissible limitation." 374 U.S. at 406 (citation omitted).
Florida intended that RFRA be even more protective of religious
practice than was the Sherbert compelling interest test by
requiring application of the "least restrictive means" analysis
to burdens on the free exercise of religion. See Florida S. Comm.
on Judiciary, Staff Analysis of CS/SB 296 at 4 (April 14, 1998)
("RFRA revived the compelling interest test, but included a least
restrictive means analysis not present in [Sherbert]"). Moreover,
the legislative history of Florida's RFRA acknowledged that
_______________
10 (... continued) if they can be shown to further a
rational or reasonable state interest, even if they do
so in an underinclusive or overinclusive manner. United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
11 Smith held that strict scrutiny review is still operative
when government action burdens a "hybrid" of religious and
associational rights. 494 U.S. at 881, 882. Such a hybrid of
rights clearly is at stake when the State indicts a Church,
thereby burdening the associational as well as the free
exercise rights of its members. Thus, all that is argued
above under Florida RFRA is equally applicable under a pure
First Amendment analysis.
__________________________________________________________________________
the impact of Florida's RFRA would parallel that of the Federal
RFRA, which "produced a broadened capacity for legal action against
the state for alleged infringement upon free exercise of religion."
Florida H. R. Comm. on Governmental Operations, Final Staff Analysis
of CS/HB 3201 at 1 (May 15, 1998). Proponents ofFlorida's RFRA
favorably noted this as "indicative of a greater protection for
religious practice," id, even emphasizing that "the compelling
interest test is also the most practical means for ensuring that
smaller and unpopular faiths receive the same level of protection
as mainstream faiths." Id. at 8, n.27.
PFRA's mandate of strict scrutiny review applies to the government's
prosecution in this action. It "applies to all state law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and
whether adopted before or after the enactment of this act." Fla.
Stat. §761.05(1). "Thus this Act's provisions are retroactive and
prospective in effect." Florida H.R. Comm. on Governmental
Operations, Final Staff Analysis of CS/HB 3201 at 10.12 Furthermore,
RFRA is applicable to the government's prosecution of the Church
because both the prosecutor and this Court fall within RFRA's
definition of the term "government", which provides that "government ...
includes any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official
or other person acting under color of law of the state, a county,
special district, municipality, or any other subdivision of the
state." Fla. Stat. §76i.02(2).13
_______________
12 Here, the act of the State that burdens the Church is the
filing of the criminal information, which, of course, occurred
after the enactment of RFRA. Thus, the question of retroactivity
is not even raised.
13 State and federal courts have consistently applied RFRA to
criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gonzales, 957 F.
Supp. 1225 (D.N.M. 1997) (dismissing criminal prosecution of
Native American for killing bald eagle without permit); Horen
v. Virginia, 479 S.E.2d 553 (Va. 1997) (reversing criminal
convictions of Native Americans for possession of wild bird
feathers and parts); State v. Singh, 690 N.E. 2d 917 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1996) (applying RFRA to state concealed (continued...)
__________________________________________________________________________
The Church is protected by RFRA because it is a "person" under
the statute. Title One of the Florida Statutes, which sets forth
the definitions of the terms to be used in construing statutes,
provides, "the word 'person' includes individuals, children, firms,
associations, joint adventures, partnerships, estates, trusts,
business trusts, syndicates, fiduciaries, corporations, and all
other groups or combinations." Fla. Stat. (§1.01. See, e.g.,
Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich.
Ct. Appeal 1995).
B. Criminal Prosecution Of The Church Burdens The Church And
Its Members In Their Exercise Of Their Religious Beliefs And Practices
The State has chosen to prosecute the Church itself, rather than
the individuals who were involved in the incidents set forth in
the Strope affidavit accompanying the felony information. Prosecution
of the Church, however, necessarily implicates the religious beliefs
of all Scientologists, brings the religion itself into disrepute,
undermines the religious teachings of the Church, interferes with
Scientology's relationships with its adherents, holds the Church
and its adherents liable for monetary penalties, and imposes legal
disabilities upon the Church and certain adherents." The burden
falls upon the Church itself and its members and parishioners,
whose rights of religious association and expression may be impinged
by a burden placed on their
_______________
13 (...continued) weapon prosecution of Sikh for carrying
religiously symbolic sword); United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d
1549 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying RFRA to prosecution of
Rastafarians for possession of marijuana), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 992 (1996); see also State v. Miller, 538 N.W.2d 573,
579 (Ct. App. Wisc. 1995) (reversing forfeiture order directing
members of Old Amish Order to pay forfeiture for failure to
display red and orange triangular slow-moving vehicle emblem
on their horse drawn buggie).
14 In this case, the prosecution also directly burdens the
Church's religious beliefs and practices concerning spiritual
treatment of "PTS Type III" behavior and the religious practice
of "Introspection Rundown." This burden, and the State's
inability to meet RFRA's strict scrutiny test to justify the
burden, is addressed in Point II, post. The discussion in the
text directly above addresses only the burden imposed upon
the Church and its members by the mere fact of prosecution
and the threat of conviction of the Church, qua church.
__________________________________________________________________________
Church. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("any
interference with the freedom of a [political] party is
simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents");
Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107,
122 (1981); Buckley v. Yaleo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976).
First and foremost, criminal prosecution and potential conviction
of the Church substantially burdens the religious practice of the
Church and Scientologists by stigmatizing the Scientology religion,
its institutions, and its leaders. This effect is dramatically
demonstrated by the widespread media coverage of the charges brought
in this case, which universally characterize the prosecution as one
directed at the entire religion of Scientology as opposed to FSO (the
religious corporation charged). See, e.g., "Florida Charges
Scientology In Church Member's Death," N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1998
(emphasis added); "Scientology Charged in Member's Death," St.
Petersburg Times, November 14, 1998, p. 1; "Scientology charged
in Death of Woman" The Tampa Tribune, November 14, 1998, p. 1;
"Scientology Accused in Death" The Oregonian, November 14, 1998.
Atfidavit of Michael Rinder, Ex. B. Lurid and one-sided coverage
ensued in the tabloid press, both print and broadcast, lending
further credence to the impression that the Scientology religion -
and thus all its ministers, staff, and even members - stand accused
of vile criminal practices. Indeed, analysis of the international
media coverage reveals that 31 percent reported that "Scientology"
was charged with the crime, 66 percent reported that the
generalized "Church of Scientology" was charged, and only 3
percent accurately reported that FSO was the target of the
charges. Id., ¶ 5. 15
_______________
"The fact that Scientology is a relatively new and growing
religion undoubtedly exacerbated the derogatory nature of
the press coverage and the resulting stigma on FSO and the
entire Scientology religion. For example, if, contrary to
200 years of precedent, criminal charges were (continued...)
__________________________________________________________________________
Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the charges, there ensued
widespread virulent anti-Scientology picketing not only at FSO, but
at Scientology churches around the world, engendering hate mail,
phone calls and threats of violence. Id., ¶ 9. In Clearwater alone,
pickets carried signs saying, inter alia, "Scientology Kills,"
"Lisa's Blood on Scientology's Hands," "Thank God L. Ron Hubbard
is Dead," and "Honk if you Hate Scientology." Anonymous
advertisements were placed on county buses carrying messages such
as "Quit Scientology." Id., ¶ 9.
While the State did not organize the pickets, place the
advertisements, write the headlines, or produce the media
coverage, there can be no doubt that it was the act of bringing
charges against the Church itself that conveyed the message of
official disapproval and thereby engendered and exacerbated the
sectarian strife described above. As the Eleventh Circuit has
emphasized, "creation of the appearance of official disapproval
for a sect may constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause."
Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization v. City of
Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1528 n.8 (11th Cir. 1993), relying
on Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (state may not "convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion").
The stigma created by the prosecution and potential for conviction
of the Church interferes with the religious practice of
Scientologists in that it invites and coerces Scientologists to
reevaluate their affiliation with the Scientology religion. For
some, the knowledge that the
_______________
"(... continued) brought against a Roman Catholic church
based on the acts of a priest, or against a Jewish synagogue
based on the acts of a rabbi or canter, it nevertheless is
inconceivable that the charges would be reported as "Catholicism
Charged" or "Judaism Charged."
__________________________________________________________________________
Church is being criminally prosecuted may be sufficient to
disaffiliate from Scientology. For others, the prosecution may
besmirch the reputation of the Church and its leaders and thereby
attacks their ecclesiastical authority. Moreover, while many
Scientologists, because of their long standing relationship with
the Church, will recognize that the allegations of the criminal
prosecution are inconsistent with their own experiences with
Scientology, for new members or those who might otherwise be attracted
to Scientology, the criminal prosecution may result in their never
achieving the enlightennent through the Scientology religion that
the Church believes will come to those who participate in its
practices. The criminal prosecution is tantamount to a statement
by the State of Florida that Scientology religious practice is a
danger to Scientologists, and consequently it makes individuals,
especially those with a limited understanding of Scientology,
loathe to engage in Scientology's religious practices.
When Florida brands the Church as criminal, it substantially burdens
the Church's ability to exercise its religion because prosecution of
the Church makes some parishioners reluctant or unwilling to
participate in Scientology's religious practices. In this regard,
the prosecution violates Florida's RFRA in the same way that Oregon
prison and law enforcement officials violated the federal RFRA when
they tape recorded conversations between prisoners and clergy,
including a confessional, even where the individual making the
confession knew of the tape recording. As the Ninth Circuit held
in Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997), the
religious exercise of a Roman Catholic priest (and his superior)
was substantially burdened by the tape recording by prison authorities
of the confession of an inmate. The court noted that the taping made
confessors reluctant to participate in the sacrament and thus, "makes
it impossible for [the priest] to minister the sacrament to those
who seek it in the jail." Id at 1530. Thus, as with
__________________________________________________________________________
the taping in Mockaitis, the prosecution here substantially burdens
the exercise of religion by the Church because it makes current and
potential parishioners less willing to engage in Scientology's
religious activities or follow its fundamental religious tenets,
especially those providing for spiritual treatment of "PTS Type
III" behavior and prohibition upon psychiatric treatment.
Indeed, criminal prosecution of the Church is the strongest possible
expression of disapproval by the State of the Church because it is
a public pronouncement by the State that the Church's religious
practices are illegal acts.
In addition, the prosecution requires a massive reorientation of
Church energy and resources. Instead of the Church and its
leadership ministering to the spiritual needs of its parishioners,
they must attend to the criminal prosecution and the many
reverberations for the Church that are occasioned by the criminal
prosecution. The spiritual needs of Scientologists may therefore
be underserved or, in extreme cases, go unmet because of the criminal
prosecution.
The prosecution further burdens the exercise of religion because it
potentially leads to tangible legal disabilities on the Church and
on Scientologists generally. If the Church is convicted and fined,
any fine would be levied on the Church but would ultimately come
out of the pockets of individual Scientologists. Moreover, the stigma
associated with criminal conviction would likely result in the
Church's public activities being substantially curtailed. Thus,
the Church and its leaders and members would likely be excluded
[from] civic organizations and from participation in community
programs including drug rehabilitation, literacy, and anti-crime
programs. Participation in these programs is inspired and promoted
by Scientology religious belief. See Atfidavit of Mary Story.
Moreover, a criminal prosecution and conviction could result in a
determination
__________________________________________________________________________
under 8 U.S.C. §1101(R) that the Church is not a "bona fide
nonprofit, religious organization" and consequently Scientologists
would be denied "special immigrant" status. If such a finding were
made, Scientologists would not be able to immigrate to the United
States for the purpose of working as Scientology ministers and the
religious mission of Scientology would be substantially burdened.
8 U.S.C. §1101(27).
Each of the above examples demonstrates the substantial burden on
religious free exercise suffered by the Church and by
Scientologists by the mere fact of the unprecedented prosecution
and potential conviction of the Church.16 Where such a substantial
burden is shown, the state must then show that the prosecution is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and that it
is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. However,
because the government is proceeding against the Church, rather
than the individuals involved in the charged conduct, neither
requirement is met, as is shown below.
C. Prosecution of the Church Does Not Further a Compelling
State Interest by the Means Least Restrictive of the Free Exercise
Rights of the Church and its Followers
The Church does not take issue with the State's compelling
interest in preventing the unauthorized practice of medicine
and in assuring that disabled persons are not abused. Even
assuming that prosecution of some or all of the acts charged
as criminal in the criminal information furthers the State's
compelling interest, the questions remain whether the State has
a compelling interest in prosecuting the Chzrrch, as opposed to
individuals, for the acts alleged, or, put somewhat differently,
whether prosecution of the Church itself is the least restrictive
means of
_______________
16 In addition, as set forth in Point II, post, by basing
the charges in major part upon the religious beliefs and
practices ofScientology concerning spiritual treatment of
mental conditions, the prosecution substantially burdens
the free exercise of those religious beliefs and practices.
__________________________________________________________________________
furthering the State's interest. We submit that the clear answer
to either question is a resounding "no."
First, it is doubtful that even in an ordinary case of a business
corporation, the State would have a compelling, as opposed to a
merely rational, interest in prosecuting the corporation but not
the individual corporate agents who commit a crime. Crimes are
committed, or even authorized or directed, by individuals. It is
the criminal conduct ultimately of individuals that the criminal
law must deter or punish. The major and probably most effective
form of deterrence and punishment available to the criminal law is
imprisonment, which can only be imposed on individuals. In the
ordinary context, a corporation is a mere shell, a legal fiction.
While the State's ability to enforce its criminal laws would be
substantially undermined if it could not prosecute individuals,
the same cannot be said with respect to corporations. While
criminal prosecutions of corporate entities may sometimes be
useful or even a convenient contrivance," it is not necessary
to [the] State.
For that reason, criminal prosecution of business corporations has
been generally limited, by policy and law, to contexts such as the
antitrust, securities, fraud, or environmental protection statutes
where the "language and subject matter" of the criminal statute
invoked "is primarily concerned with the activities of business
entities," and "the corporation, and not the individual agents,
will have realized the profits fiom the illegal activity." United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, 467 F.2d 1000, 1004, 1006
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). See State
v. Municipal Auto Sales, 222 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1969)
_______________
17 Indeed, often a criminal prosecution will be resolved
by acceptance of a plea and fine from a corporation, with
no criminal liability for the individuals responsible for
the underlying conduct. While such a resolution typically
is considered less burdensome, the opposite is true here
precisely because the "corporation" is a church.
______________________________________________________________________
(corporation may be liable for acts of its employees only if the
acts were "committed in furtherance of the business of the
corporation [and] authorized or acquiesced in by the corporation".)
Neither criteria exists in this case. Not only are Florida's
statutes governing abuse or neglect and practicing medicine without
a license not "primarily concerned with the activities of business
entities," they in fact are directed exclusively at individual
acts.18 Likewise, the State does not even attempt to [a?] nor could
it, that the acts of the individuals upon which the charges are
based were intended to or did economically benefit the Church. Agent
Strope implies the contrary, by alleging that in the two years
preceding Lisa's death, Lisa "spent" $70,000 for Church services.
In fact, Lisa made donations to her Church, prior to and unrelated
to the events of November 1995, which are recognized and treated
as charitable deductions under Section 170(c) of Internal Revenue
Code - just like donations to any other religion.
Thus, the criteria that may justify criminal prosecution of even
an ordinary business corporation simply are not present here. A
fortiori, the State has no interest, compelling or otherwise, in
prosecuting the Church, as opposed to the individuals, under the
criminal statutes at
_______________
18 The abuse or neglect statute is directed at abuse
by a "relative, caregiver, or adult household member."
Fla. Stat. § 825.101(1)(1995). A "caregiver" is defined
exclusively as an individual, not an institution or
a corporation. Fla. Stat. § 825.101(3) (1995). Similarly,
the law relating to unauthorized practice of medicine is
also concerned with the individual conduct of physicians.
As Fla. Stat. § 458.301, declaring the purpose of Chapter
458, clearly states:
The primary legislative purpose in enacting this chapter
is to ensure that every physician practicing in this state
meets minimum requirements for safe practice. It is the
legislative intent that physicians who fall below minimum
competency or who otherwise present a danger to the public
shall be prohibited from practicing in this state.
Fla. Stat. § 458.301 (1998) (emphasis added.). In fact, there is
no Florida case in which a hospital or any corporation has even
been charged with the unauthorized practice of medicine. The provision
applies exclusively to individual practitioners only.
__________________________________________________________________________
issue here. Indeed, Florida has recognized that under the statutes
at issue here it has no legitimate interest in prosecuting either
individuals or churches for the provision of spiritual care, even
for medical conditions, by providing specific religious exemptions
from the statutory schemes regulating abuse of disabled adults and
practicing medicine without a license. Fla. Stat. § 415.113 ("treatment
by spiritual means" does not constitute abuse or neglect); Fla.
Stat. § 458.303(1)(g) ("the practice of the religious tenets of
any church in this state" does not constitute practice of medicine).
See also Fla. Stat. § 491.014 (exempts activity of member of clergy
from Florida's regulation and licensure of "clinical, counseling,
and psychotherapy services").
Moreover, even if in certain circumstances the State may have a
compelling interest in obtaining a criminal conviction against a
business corporation for the very purpose of tainting such a
corporation with the label "criminal," such an interest is not
only not compelling but illegitimate with respect to a church.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (state may not "convey a message of... disapproval
of religion"); Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization
v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d at 1528, n.8 ("creation of the
appearance of official disapproval for a sect may constitute a
violation of the Establishment Clause"). As we have shown, the
bringing of such a prosecution against a Church has far greater
consequences upon a vast array of religious believers, who had
no connection to the criminal conduct at issue, than it does upon
the shareholders ofa business corporation. The State indeed has
the power to inflict far greater and wider punishment by
[prosecuting] the Church rather than the individuals, but it
has no legitimate interest in so doing. That is so because the
effect of the punishment would be to substantially burden the
exercise of religious belief, rather than to sanction the precise
conduct to be condemned by conviction. To say that the State has an
__________________________________________________________________________
interest, compelling or otherwise, to wreak such damage is to
turn the Constitution on its head.
Second, the State's legitimate and compelling interest in enforcing
its criminal laws certainly is sufficiently advanced and protected
by the less restrictive means of prosecution of the individuals
responsible for the acts, and not the Church itself. Such narrowly
focused prosecutions minimize the damage to the legitimate free
exercise rights of the Church and its innocent members. Yet the
wrongdoers may be punished, and future wrongdoers may be deterred.
As stated by one court in rejecting a civil claim against a church
for conduct of church members:
A church always remains free to espouse whatever religious belief it
chooses; it is the practices of its adherents that may be subject to
state sanctions.
Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 826 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
The Supreme Court has exhibited great sensitivity to the
inappropriate impact of punishment upon the members of an
organization, as opposed to the particular malefactors, in at
least two analogous cases dealing with punitive damages in civil
cases. In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), the Court prohibited the imposition
of punitive damages against labor unions for breaches of their
duty of fair representation, finding that punitive damages awards
would "deplete union treasuries, thereby impairing the
effectiveness of unions as collective-bargaining agents," and
inhibit the unions in carrying out essential discretionary acts.
Id. at 50-51. The Court emphasized that the impact of such awards
would be felt principally by the union membership and would burden
the exercise of associational and collective bargaining rights
guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act.
Similarly, the Court barred punitive damages against
municipalities in actions
__________________________________________________________________________
brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247 (1981). The Court again emphasized the disparity
between the wrongdoer and those who would actually suffer from
the imposition of punitive damages. The Court held that the
potential impact of a large judgment upon local treasuries and
thus on municipal services was reason enough to prohibit such
awards.
Surely the rights of religious association and free exercise
protected by the First Amendment and RFRA are as precious as the
rights of labor association and collective bargaining, and the
interests of taxpayers to avoid paying for the illegal acts of
municipal employees. Just as in Foust and Newport the State had
no legitimate interest in imposing punitive damages, a felony
conviction against the Church would serve no legitimate, let
alone compelling, government interest. The true victims of any
such punishment would be Church members and contributors.19
The historical fact that in no reported case has a church in this country
ever been criminally convicted stands as irrefutable evidence that such
prosecutions are not necessary to protect the State's interest in enforcing
its criminal laws. The fact that for two centuries prosecutors have avoided
taking such a draconian step as indicting a church for a crime shows that
prosecutors have not perceived a compelling interest in doing so, as well as
their respect for religious liberty. The fact that this very St ate Attorney
chose to indict only the Reverend Henry Lyons, but not his Church, in the
face of that Church's defiant ratification of Reverend Lyons' acts, raises
the troubling question of why the instant indictment was brought against FSO,
and not
_______________
19 Indeed, the forced reallocation of funds to pay such an
award would create a breach of faith between the Church and
its adherents. Just as the state cannot intervene to
adjudicate disputes between a church and its members over
matters of faith, organization and administration, see,
e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976), the state cannot force the Church to
reallocate its funds away from their intended religious
purposes and thereby set the stage for an internal dispute
within the Church.
__________________________________________________________________________
individuals.
The Court need not reach that troubling question, however. RFRA
points the way to the proper resolution of this case. Because the
State could have protected its legitimate interests by the less
restrictive means, including indicting the individuals responsible
for the specific acts alleged to be criminal, the prosecution
against the Church itself should be dismissed.
II. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF THE CHURCH FOR THE ACTS OF ITS CLERGY
AND STAFF IN ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE SPIRITUAL ASSISTANCE FOR LISA
McPHERSON AND FOR FARING TO REFER HER TO A PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL
AGAINST HER CLEARLY EXPRESSED RELIGIOUS BELIEFS VIOLATES THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND FLORIDA RFRA
As we have shown, the criminal information and affidavit supporting
it charge as criminal the acts of church staff in assisting Lisa
McPherson's religious-based decisions to leave Morton Plant Hospital
and to reject psychiatric treatment; in attempting to provide
spiritual assistance to Ms. McPherson, consistent with Ms.
McPherson's decision on November 18, 1995 to decline treatment
at Morton Plant Hospital and to "go with my friends from the
congregation;" and in failing to refer Lisa McPherson for
psychiatric treatment when her psychotic-like behavior became
more pronounced. As we have shown, these acts were consistent
with deeply held religious beliefs of the Scientology religion,
and oflisa McPherson herself.
In fact, as even the Strope affidavit makes clear, Lisa McPherson
chose to go with her co-religionists to the FSO for the sole and
express purpose of receiving spiritual assistance pursuant to
Scientology religious beliefs and practices, and not to receive
medical treatment of any kind. It is equally clear that every
act that Lisa's co-religionists undertook with respect to Lisa
during the period November 18 - December 5, 1995 at the FSO was
done as part of a
__________________________________________________________________________
religious process to deal with a spiritual condition known in
Scientology as PTS Type III. Thus, Janis Johnson and others informed
Dr. Minkoff that Ms. McPherson "was a 'type three' meaning
psychotic" (Strope Aff., p. 9), invoking a term they both understood
to describe a spiritual condition pursuant to the Scientology
religion, and not a medical condition. Indeed, no physical symptoms
emerged until December 1. See Strope Aff. 20
It is a fundamental violation of the religious free exercise rights
of the Church and its members, as protected by Florida RFRA, to
impose criminal sanctions against it for these acts of its clergy,
staff, and adherents. As the charging affidavit of Agent Strope
acknowledges, and as the hospital records demonstrate, Ms. McPherson
affinnatively adhered to her Church's strongly held religious views
against psychiatric treatment, and adamantly rejected it when she
was brought to Morton Plant Hospital. The medical staff at the
hospital found she was competent to make that decision, and
respected her religious choice. So must the Court.
The acts of Lisa's co-religionists (and of Lisa) fall precisely
within the definition of "exercise ofreligion" set forth in RFRA:
Exercise of religion means an act or refusal to act that is
substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether or not the
religious exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of
religious belief.
Fla. Stat. § 761.02(3).
The criminal charges in this case directly burden the free
exercise rights not only of
_______________
20 When Janis Johnson concluded that Lisa had developed
a physical condition that appeared to require medical
attention, she took her to the hospital, albeit too late.
That Johnson and perhaps others may have been negligent
in failing to recognize the seriousness of Lisa's physical
condition fast enough or in delaying bringing her to
the hospital is indeed lamentable, even if it can be
explained by the unfortunately stressfUl circumstances created
by the entire episode. The negligence of such individuals,
however, cannot supply a basis for criminally charging the
Church, especially in the face of RFRA, for the reasons
outlined in Point I, ante, and Point III, post.
__________________________________________________________________________
the individual Scientologists involved, but of all Scientologists and
of the Church itself.
According to these charges, neither the Church nor Scientologists may
exercise their religious beliefs requiring spiritual assistance with
respect to "PTS Type III" behavior, upon pain of criminal prosecution
and conviction. Rather, the Church and its followers must agree to
refer all Scientologists experiencing such a condition to
psychiatrists, contrary to their own wishes and fundamental
religious precepts. It is hard to imagine a more direct interference
with religious free exercise. Not only is the Church threatened
with criminal punishment because its staff members exercised their
religious beliefs, but all Scientologists will be severely chilled
from exercising such beliefs in the future, and could be compelled
to violate their beliefs and subject themselves to psychiatric
treatment, anathema to their religion, for fear of criminal prosecution
and conviction.
The State cannot meet the strict scrutiny applied under RFRA to
the imposition of such a burden upon religious free exercise.
Rather, as it does with respect to the objections of the Christian
Science religion to medical care for physical ailments and to
Jehovah's Witnesses to blood transfusions, the State must accommodate
the religious beliefs and practices of the Scientology religion.
Indeed, there is far less of a compelling government interest in
burdening Scientology's spiritual assistance with respect to mental
conditions and objections to psychiatry than exists with respect
to the beliefs and practices of religions such as Christian Science
and Jehovah's Witnesses, where the refusal to accept medical
treatment can and often does lead directly to death. Yet the State
accommodates the latter beliefs;21 afortiori, it must accommodate
the beliefs and practices of Scientology.
_______________
"Even where prosecutors have brought criminal charges
against Christian Scientists or Jehovah's Witnesses where
their spiritual healing allegedly led to the death of a
child, in no case was the Christian Science or Jehovah's
Witness Church criminally charged.
__________________________________________________________________________
Thus, where an adult declines medical treatment even for life
threatening physical ailments, on the basis of sincerely held
religious beliefs, and seeks instead to pursue spiritual healing,
the spiritual healers cannot be found liable even on a civil
claim. Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 141
Ill. App. 3d 898, 490 N.E.2d 1319, 1326, cert, denied, 107 S.Ct.
317 (1986) ("a competent adult has the right under the first
amendment to refuse medical treatment when it conflicts with
his religious beliefs"). In Baumgartner, the court affirmed the
dismissal of a complaint against the Christian Science Church by
the estate of a man who died while voluntarily undergoing
Christian Science faith healing instead of ordinary medical
treatment.
The court rejected the estate's claims of medical malpractice,
Christian Science malpractice, ordinary negligence, and intentional
and reckless disregard of safety, holding that the First Amendment
barred any such claims:
For the court to determine whether defendants breached any duty owed
to decedent would require a searching inquiry into Christian Science
beliefs and the validity of such beliefs. As established above, such
an inquiry is precluded by the first amendment.
Whether or not defendants negligently or intentionally applied church
doctrine is not a justiciable controversy.
Id., 490 N.E.2d at 1325, 1326. See also Lewis v. Holy Spirit
Association, 589 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D. Mass. 1983); Katz v. Superior
Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal.Rptr. 234 (1977).
Afortiori, where the question is not the declination of medical
treatment for a physical illness,22 but rather the provision of
spiritual assistance and the refusal to participate in psychiatric
treatment for so-called psychological conditions, the religious
choices of the Church and its adult parishioners - including Lisa
McPherson herself- must be protected under the First
_______________
22 As we have seen the Scientology religion affirms the
use of the medical profession to cure physical ailments.
Reiss Aff., ¶¶ 44, 45.
__________________________________________________________________________
Amendment and RFRA.
In Nally v. Grace Community Church, 47 Cal.3d 278, 253 Cal.Rptr.
97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1644 (1989), the California
Supreme Court held that religious counselors and churches cannot
be held liable for continuing to provide religious counseling to
an emotionally disturbed parishioner, or for failing to refer
such a parishioner to a "mental health professional," even where
it is foreseeable that the parishioner might imminently commit
suicide.
While the Nally court interpreted state tort law, it strongly
suggested that imposition of liability in such circumstances
would be "quite possibly unconstitutional" because "[s]uch a
duty would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy
of the particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the
religious entity." 253 Cal.Rptr. at 109.
Under RFRA, Florida may not criminalize the very kind of
religious-based conduct California refused to recognize as a
tort in Nally. That the State has no compelling interest in
prohibiting churches from providing religious or spiritual healing
for "psychological" conditions, even severe ones, is made
manifest by the fact that Florida has exempted religious counselors
from the regulatory and licensing requirements otherwise reserved
for "mental health" therapists. Fla. Stat. § 491.014. Even more
telling, Florida has specifically excepted churches providing
spiritual counseling from the provisions of the Florida Adult
Protective Services Act. Fla. Stat. §§415.101-415.113 (1998):
Nothing in ss. 415.101 - 415.112 shall be construed to mean a person
is abused, neglected, or in need of emergency or protective services
for the sole reason that the person relies upon and is, therefore,
being furnished treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in
accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or
religious denomination...
__________________________________________________________________________
Fla. Stat. § 415.113. Indeed, this statute would appear to
preclude Count I of the criminal charges in this case, both
as a direct exemption, and as a clear indication, under RFRA,
that Florida has no compelling interest in criminally prosecuting
the Church for providing spiritual assistance even to a
purportedly "disabled" person.23
Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992) is directly on
point.24 In Hermanson, the Florida Supreme Court held that the
religious and spiritual treatment exemption to Florida's Act
for Protective Services for Abused and Neglected Children, Fla.
Stat. §415.503(9)(f), when read in pari materia with Florida's
criminal child abuse statute, Fla. Stat. §827.04, precludes
criminal prosecution for spiritual treatment of a child leading
to death. The Court found that the State had not clearly
legislated a policy of criminal liability for spiritual treatment
of children, and that, in the absence of a clear legislative
mandate, due process required reversal of a conviction for criminal
child abuse because the statutory scheme was void for vagueness.
The statutory scheme in this case parallels that in Hermanson.
Here, Fla. Stat. §415.113 provides a religious exemption similar
to that established in Fla. Stat. § 415.503(9)(f) (the Hermanson
exemption). Here, Section 415.113 must be read in pari materia
with Florida's criminal disabled adult abuse statute, Section
825.102, to preclude criminal prosecution for spiritual treatment
of a disabled adult pursuant to religious belief, for the same due
_______________
23 A similarly dispositive exception is provided in Florida's
statute respecting practicing medicine without a license.
Section 458.303(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Separate motions
have been filed concurrently to dismiss each count on the
basis of the exemptions for religious practice, as well as
other non-RFRA grounds.
24 The Church's separate motion to dismiss Count 1 relies
precisely on Hermanson, inter alia. Our point in discussing
it here is to show, as stated in the text, that Florida has
articulated no interest, compelling or otherwise, in
criminalizing spiritual treatment under Section 825.102,
Florida Statutes.
__________________________________________________________________________
process/vagueness reasons as set forth in Hermanson.
Hermanson is especially controlling in light of RFRA. The State's
failure to clearly articulate a policy of criminal liability for
spiritual treatment of children and disabled adults - even those
suffering fiom life threatening physical medical conditions -
demonstrates dramatically that the State has not asserted a compelling
state interest in bringing such prosecutions, as RFRA requires.
In this case, of course, the medical personnel at Morton Plant
Hospital decided to respect the religious preferences of the
Church and of Lisa McPherson. See Stilo Aff., Ex. C. Her tragic
death, due to causes other than her rejection of psychiatric
treatment for religious reasons and other than the spiritual
assistance offered her by her co-religionists, does not alter
the fact that that determination was the only constitutionally
permissible decision.
III. IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY UPON THE CHURCH IS
ESPECIALLY IMPERMISSIBLE UNDER RFRA BECAUSE THE CHARGES ARE
FOUNDED UPON A THEORY OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND THE CHURCH
DID NOT AUTHORIZE, DIRECT, OR RATIFY THE ALLEGEDLY NEGLIGENT
ACTS OF JANIS JOHNSON AND DR MINKOFF
We have shown that the acts of the Church's staff members with
respect to Lisa McPherson, as set forth in Agent Strope's
affidavit, were undertaken pursuant to the strongly held religious
beliefs and practices of those individuals, as well as of Lisa
McPherson herself.
The Strope affidavit also alleges that Janis Johnson and perhaps
several other staff members in effect acted negligently in not
timely recognizing or acting upon the onset of serious physical
symptoms with respect to Ms. McPherson. In particular, Agent Strope
alleges that Janis Johnson and others delayed at least several
hours, and perhaps several days, in bringing Ms. McPherson to a
hospital, and that that negligence may have resulted in her death.
__________________________________________________________________________
In addition, Agent Strope alleges that, in the course of providing
spiritual assistance to Lisa McPherson for her "PTS Type III"
condition, Janis Johnson acted improperly in giving Lisa McPherson
injections of magnesium chloride,25 and that Dr. Minkoff, who was
not even a staff member FSO, improperly prescribed chloral hydrate
without personally observing Lisa.26
It is especially egregious to charge the Church for these acts
because the charges are founded upon a theory of vicarious liability.
Neither the charges nor the Strope affidavit even attempt to allege
that the Church itself directed Janis Johnson to administer
injections without proper medical authority, or, as Strope alleges,
to improperly obtain a prescription from Dr. Minkoff. Nor does the
State allege that the Church authorized or directed Johnson to act
negligently by not bringing Ms. McPherson to the hospital in a
timely manner when she manifested deterioratingphysicaI symptoms
in the last two or three days. Nor could the State in good faith
make such allegations. As the Reiss affidavit makes clear, medical
examination and diagnosis should be sought where needed. Reiss
Aff., ¶¶ 44-45, 56, 61(G). As Mr. Hubbard wrote, "when a preclear
comes to us because he wishes to be physically cured of a real
current illness or malfunction, we do not serve him well if [when]
we see he does not respond to auditing we do not require a full
physical clinical study of his body until a real illness is found
and treated.
_______________
25 Injectable magnesium chloride is a mineral and is not
and cannot be used to treat illness. It thus does not meet
the definition of "medicine," which is defined as a substance
"used in treating a disease or illness." Random House
Unabridged Dictionary (2nd Ed. 1994). Indeed it is not
even mentioned in the Physician's Desk Reference (1998
ed.). While it may not be injected without prescription,
there is no claim that the Church authorized or directed
Janis Johnson to fail to obtain a prescription before
authorizing an injection of magnesium chloride to Lisa
McPherson.
26 Dr. Minkoff's alleged act hardly constitutes
practicing medicine without a license, since he had
a license.
__________________________________________________________________________
If we already know he is ill, we should call in the doctor." Id., ¶ 44.
Since these acts were neither directed, authorized nor ratified by
the Church, the only basis for holding the Church criminally liable
for such acts is on a theory of vicarious liability. Whether
analyzed under RFRA or under well established case law under the
First Amendment, such a theory of criminal liability against a
Church is unsupportable.
The State certainly has no compelling interest in holding a Church
criminally liable, and thereby substantially burdening the free
exercise rights of the Church and its followers in the manifest
and substantial ways described above, at the least where the Church
did not direct the very acts alleged as criminal. Indeed, the State
has no interest, compelling or otherwise, in applying its criminal
sanctions to a person or entity who did not act in a knowing and
willfull manner, absent, at least, a clear legislative mandate:
"The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the
exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence," Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951),
and its elimination is highly disfavored in our jurisprudence.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The deterrence
function of the criminal law certainly is not fUrthered by such
a prosecution, since the Church need not be deterred from condoning
conduct it already condemns. Similarly, the State can have no
compelling interest in punishing a Church and its members for
the errant, albeit well-meaning, conduct of the Church's staff.
Indeed, the general rule in Florida is that corporations are not
criminally liable for the acts of their employees unless they
"authorized or acquiesced in" the acts in issue. State v. Municipal
Auto Sales, 222 So. 2d 278, 279 (3rd DCA. 1969).
The sole purpose of imposing vicarious criminal liability against
any institution is
__________________________________________________________________________
to pressure it to employ more strict forms of supervision or
control over its personnel. See United Stares v. A&P Trucking
Co., 212 U.S. 121, 126 (1958) (vicarious corporate criminal
liability is designed to ensure that "pressure is brought on
those who own the entity to see to it that their agents abide
by the law"). In the context of this case, however, the State
may not constitutionally assert an interest in compelling a
church to exercise closer control or greater discipline over
the actions of its clergy and staffmembers. To impose such control
over churches would be to impose a substantial burden upon
churches' determinations of their own governance, a matter at
the core of their flee exercise rights. As we have shown, such
a burden can be mandated by the State only in furtherance of a
compelling state interest, and only by the least restrictive
means.
Here, the State not only has no compelling interest in dictating
matters of church governance, supervision, and discipline of its
clergy and staff, but such an interest is itself illegitimate
under the First Amendment. Matters of "discipline, faith, internal
organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law" are
exclusively within the domain of the Church, and may not be the
subject of judicial control. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976). Churches retain "power to
decide for themselves, flee from state interference, matters of
church government..." Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S.
94, 116 (1952). In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S.
490 (1979), the Supreme Court limited application of the National
Labor Relations Act so as to exclude coverage of lay teachers in
Catholic schools, because determination of employment practices,
discipline, and conduct with respect even to non-religious
employees threatened to violate the religion clauses of the First
Amendment. The Court warned, "It is not only the conclusions that
may be reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed
by the Religious Clauses, but also the very process of
__________________________________________________________________________
inquiry leading to findings and conclusions." 440 U.S. at 502. The
Fourth Circuit subsequently applied Catholic Bishop to bar
application to religious bodies of Title VII of the federal civil
rights statutes barring discrimination in employment, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq., stating "[b]ureaucratic suggestion in employment
decisions ofa pastoral character, in contravention of a church's
own perception of its needs and purposes, would constitute
unprecedented entanglement with religious authority." Rayburn v.
General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020(1986). See also Scharon v.
St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.
1991) (review of personnel decisions regarding clergy under Title
VII would require excessive entanglement in religious affairs).
Accordingly, numerous courts have refused to permit even civil
claims against churches based upon theories that the churches
should have exercised greater care and supervision over their
clergy or staff.
When a civil court undertakes to compare the relationship between a
religious institution and its clergy with the agency relationship of
the business world, secular duties are necessarily introduced into
the ecclesiastical relationship and the risk of constitutional
violation is evident.
Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop ofPortland, 692 A.2d 441, 444
(Me. 1997). See also Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533
N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1116 (1996) (holding
torts of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision as against
church barred by First Amendment due to excessive entanglement and
chilling effect of award of damages); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d
239, 247 (Mo. 1997) ("Adjudicating the reasonableness of a church's
supervision of a cleric - what the church 'should know' - requires
inquiry into religious doctrine," creating excessive entanglement,
inhibiting religion, and endorsing a particular model of
__________________________________________________________________________
ecclesiastical supervision); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321,
328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (First Amendment bars action against Church
for negligent hiring, retention and supervision because pastor is
not analogous to common law employee and question of church's
supervision involves entanglement in intridate principles of church
governance; any award of damages "would restrict the church's
freedom to interact with its clergy in the manner deemed proper
by ecclesiastical authorities and would not serve a societal
interest sufficient to overcome the religious freedoms inhibited");
Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ohio 1990) (same); Tichenor v.
Roman Catholic Church of New Orleans, 32 F.3d 953, 960 (5th Cir.
1994) (Church not liable for failure to supervise when employee
engages in independent criminal conduct that results in plaintiffs
injuries).
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeals was "persuaded by the
reasoning expressed in Swanson" and the "additional case law"
cited above, finding it "compelling," Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d
286, 290, 291 (4th DCA 1998), stating:
In a church defendant's determination to hire or retain a minister,
or in its capacity as supervisor of that minister, a church
defendant's conduct is guided by religious doctrine and/or practice.
Thus, a court's determination regarding whether the church
defendant's conduct was "reasonable" would necessarily entangle the
court in issues of the church's religious law, practices, and
polices. "Hiring" in traditional sense does not occur in some
religions, where a person is ordained into a particular position in
the church, and assigned to one parish or another. A court faced with
the task of determining a claim of negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision would measure the church defendants' conduct against that
of a reasonable employer, a proscribed comparison.
Id. at 291. 27
_______________
27 The Fourth District would find an exception where the
state seeks to "protect its children against injuries
caused by pedophiles by authorizing civil damages against
a church that knowingly (continued...)
__________________________________________________________________________
If First Amendment principles, standing alone, are sufficient to
bar imposition of even civil liability upon a church under a
respondeat superior or vicarious liability basis, then certainly
the First Amendment, buttressed by the stringent standards of
Florida RFRA, bars criminal prosecution under a similar theory.
As the Eleventh Circuit emphasized in declaring Clearwater's
solicitation ordinance unconstitutional on the grounds, inter
alia, that it authorized "interference [inl matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine," "when combined
with the imposition of criminal enforcement mechanisms, the regime
may become doubly offensive." Church of Scientology Flag Service
Organization v. City of Clearwater, 2F.3d at 1537, 1538.
Prosecuting the Church for the actions of individual Scientologists
is too attenuated a means to achieve the ends of controlling the
actions of individual Scientologists, and therefore it does not
advance a compelling governmental interest and it is not the least
restrictive means of achieving that interest. Prosecution of the
individuals involved, rather than the Church itself, is a less
restrictive means for achieving the government's interests.
Indeed, even with respect to secular organizations engaged in
political or social speech or advocacy, application of ordinary
principles of respondeat superior liability is prohibited where
such application threatens to burden the rights of association
or speech. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (1982),
the Supreme Court held that the NAACP could not be held liable in
tort for the violent acts of its agents, including its Field
Secretary, because the organization had not authorized, directed
or ratified such acts.
_______________
27 (...continued)(including should know) creates a situation
in which such injuries are likely to occur." Id. at 289
(emphasis added). Such an exception is, ofcourse, not
applicable here, where the State seeks to impose criminal
liability on a respondeat superior basis for the negligence
of Janis Johnson that the Church did not authorize, direct
or ratify.
__________________________________________________________________________
Claiborne Hardware involved a sometimes violent black community
boycott of white-owned businesses in Mississippi. The state trial
court not only held the boycotters liable under Mississippi law
for the loss of business and goodwill caused by the boycott, but
found the NAACP vicariously liable for acts of Charles Evers, a
Field Secretary for the NAACP and an organizer of the boycott.
The Supreme Court reversed. In determining whether Evers' relationship
with the NAACP justified the imposition of derivative liability,
the Court considered whether "Charles Evers or any other NAACP
member had either actual or apparent authority to commit acts
of violence," Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 930, and whether the
NAACP ratified or had specific knowledge of any violence, see id.
at 930-31. Finding that while the NAACP had supported the boycott
itself, which was protected under the First Amendment, it had in
no way authorized or ratified violence in support of the boycott,
the Court held that "to impose liability ... would impermissibly
burden the rights of political association that are protected by
the First Amendment." 28
Claiborne Hardware limits derivative liability to protect freedom
of association. The reach of vicarious liability is potentially
endless, and crushing verdicts, civil or criminal, based on such
attenuated claims can easily silence organizations engaged in
protected association, speech and advocacy. As the Court explained
in Claiborne Hardware: "To equate the liability of the national
organization with that of the Branch in the absence of any proof
that the national authorized or ratified the misconduct in question
could ultimately destroy it. The rights of political association
are fiagile enough without adding the additional threat of destruction
by
_______________
28 The Court made it plain that this holding was wholly
independent of its separate holding that Evers' leadership
and organization of the boycott, even when combined with
his emotionally charged rhetoric, did not justify imposing
liability on him for violent acts that occurred weeks or
months after one of his speeches.
__________________________________________________________________________
lawsuit." Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 931-32 (quoting NAACP
v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 122 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting
from dismissal of writ of certiorari)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).29
The same concern for the associational rights of innocent members
of organizations has mandated application of strict scrutiny to
efforts to impute wrongful conduct by elements within an
organization to the organization as a whole. Thus, in Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Supreme Court found that a
campus S.D.S. Chapter could not be denied recognition by a
university administration simply because of its association
with other S.D.S. groups across the country, some of which
called for unlawful action. Recognizing the principle articulated
in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957), that
restrictions placed upon an organization infringe the associational
rights of its members, the Court held that the local chapter was
entitled to recognition as long as it agreed to abide by university
rules.
Labor law provides a usefUl area for comparison in determining the
scope of vicarious liability of a religious organization. As early
as 1922, the Supreme Court refUsed to hold an international union
liable for the conduct of local strikers during a labor dispute.
United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S.
344 (1922). After examining the
_______________
29 Cases following Claiborne Hardware include In re
Asbestos School Litigation, 46 F.3d 1284, 1290-91 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding that Claiborne's standard was "meant
to have general applicability," even to a business
corporation such as Pfizer. Pfizer's membership in an
association known as the Safe Building Alliance ("SBA"),
which had disseminated to plaintiffs misleading information
about asbestos, did not render Pfizer "liable for any
wrongful conduct committed by the SBA or its members ...
unless it can be shown that Pfizer's actions taken in
relation to the SBA were specifically intended to further
such wrongful conduct"); Hvamstad v. Suhler, 727 F. Supp.
51 1, 516 (D. Minn. 1989) ("the Supreme Court has limited
the extent to which persons may be criminally punished or
subjected to civil liability for the unlawful behavior of
their associates") (citing to Claiborne), aff'd, 915 F.2d
1218 (8th Cir. 1990); Tsilimos v. NAACP, 370 S.E.2d 816,
818 (Ga. 1988). And see the labor cases, cited [post?]
at n.30.
__________________________________________________________________________
policies of the International Union as embodied in its Constitution,
the Court concluded that the larger organization had no duty to
control the strikers and that the union workers who were on strike
were not carrying out the policies of the International Union. 259
U.S. at 395. The Court's concern for the associational rights of the
membership as a whole was emphasized in the second Coronado Coal
decision, Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268
U.S. 295 (1925) [Coronado II]. The Court stated that before imposing
liability on an association of 450,000 men, it had to be shown
that "what was done was done by their agents in accordance with
their fundamental agreement ofassociation." 268 U.S. at 304. Based
on the absence of such proof, the Court affirmed a directed verdict
for the International Union in the Coronado Coal case.'"
The Supreme Court has acted with similar care in the context of
claims brought pursuant to the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §1983.
In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), the Court vacated an
injunction against the Philadelphia Police Department to rectify
alleged police brutality, on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to show a pattern of abuse pervading the organization as
a whole. As the Court later observed in discussing Rizzo:
_______________
30 Indeed, in a variety of recent cases courts have
applied the principles of Claiborne Hardware to protect the
associational rights of labor unions and their members.
Thus, in Presrite Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America,
No. 48113, 1985 WL 6829 (Ohio Ct. App. 8 Dist. June 6,
1985), the court held that punitive damages could not be
imposed against the United Steelworkers union because there
was no evidence that the union authorized or ratified any
acts of malice. Id at *13 (quoting Claiborne, 45
8 U.S. at 930-31). See Ex parte United Steelworkers of America,
Local Union 7533 v. United Steelworkers of America, 536 So.2d
32 (Ala. 1988) (holding under Claiborne that union's liability
must be based on evidence that union itself authorized,
participated in, or ratified the contemptuous acts and affirming
judgment because evidence was sufficient to support finding that
union itself authorized or ratified the unlawful acts), cert,
denied, 490 U.S. 1046, 109 S.Ct. 1954 (1989); United Steelworkers
of America AFL-CIO-CLC v. O 'Neal, 437 So.2d 101, 102 (Ala.
1983) (plaintiff argued that union's failure to repudiate acts
of violence, in addition to providing legal counsel for those
charged with strike, served as ratification of the violence;
judgment for plaintiff reversed because there was no evidence
that union authorized or ratified acts of violence).
__________________________________________________________________________
Collective responsibility should be limited to instances in
which a concerted design existed to accomplish a wrongful
objective.
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920, n.55. Following
Rizzo, in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court held that municipalities
could not be held liable for damages under §1983 "unless action
pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a
constitutional tort." 436 U.S. at 691. The Court specifically
refused to permit municipal liability on a respondeat superior
basis, noting that the traditional justifications of spreading
the cost of injuries and encouraging employers to control their
employes' actions were not sufficient to place such a burden upon
municipal government. 436 U.S. at 694. Thus, to be liable
under §1983 for a constitutional tort committed by an employee,
a municipality must have either commanded the unlawful result or
adopted a policy which inevitably produced such a consequence. 31
The approach adopted by the Court in Claiborne and the other
cases described above provides the proper framework for considering
the claims against the Church here. The Church cannot be tainted by
the negligent actions of a few unless the Church approved,
authorized, or ratified the alleged criminal conduct. A heavy
burden rests on the State to prove that the alleged acts were,
in fact, committed pursuant to Church direction, rather than by
a few wayward staff members. Because that stringent burden not only
cannot be met, but is not even alleged, the principles embodied in
Claiborne and its predecessors, as reinforced by Florida
_______________
31 An instructive case in the religious arena is O 'Moore
v. Driscoll, 28 P.2d 438 (Cal. District Court of Appeal
1933). O'Moore sued a Dominician Order of the Catholic
Church claiming that the Order's President, Driscoll, had
ordered O'Moore, a member of the Order, to go to a Church-
operated asylum in Montreal, where he was confined against
his will for more than two years, administered drugs,
harassed and forced to sign documents. Id. at 440. The
Court held that the Order could not be held liable because
the acts alleged were not "in line with the accomplishment
of the purpose for which [the Order] exists"- i.e., to
spread the gospel. Id. at 442.
__________________________________________________________________________
RFRA, demand that these claims of vicarious criminal liability
against the Church be dismissed.
Given the possibility that religious doctrine may be subject
to varying interpretations within the membership ofa church, it
would be impermissible to burden the constitutional rights of
religious congregations by holding them collectively liable for
criminal conduct absent clear evidence that the Church authorized
such conduct. An organization's failure to take affirmative steps
to control the criminal conduct of its members is not in itself
sufficient to create collective responsibility. E.g, Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376-78 (1976) (§1983 suit); United Mine
Wbrkers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, (1922).
Thus, the Church may not be held liable in this case because it
clearly did not authorize or ratiy the criminal conduct alleged.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the felony information brought against
FSO should be dismissed in its entirety.
Dated: May , 1999
Respectfully submitted,
Of Counsel: LEE FUGATE
ERIC M. LIEBERMAN FL Bar No. 170928
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, SPN # 00015107
Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C. MORRIS WEINBERG, JR.
740 Broadway, 5th Floor FL Bar No. 486401
New York, New York 10003 LAURA L. VAUGHAN
(212) [xxx-xxxx] FL Bar No. 843660
ZUCKERMAN, SPAEDER, TAYLOR
& EVANS, L.L.P.
401 E. Jackson Street, Suite 2525
Tampa, Florida 33602
(813) [xxx-xxxx]
Counsel for Church of Scientology
Flag Service Organization
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA
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